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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Republic of Germany has a set of individual employ-
ment rights, provided by legislation, regarding the content and termi-
nation of the employment relationship.' These laws focus on
providing a minimum protection for workers, thereby limiting the in-
dividual freedom of contract. This protection is not dependant on
union membership or collective bargaining. Collective agreements
may further improve the minimum protection for unionized workers.
In relation to the legal minimum standards such agreements are noth-
ing but additional instruments of protection.
Labour legislation -is mainly federal legislation. Throughout the
Federal Republic the same protective standards apply. Therefore,
* Professor of Labour Law, J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt, FRG.
1. For a survey see M. WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 39-103 (1987).
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although the legislation of the individual states within the Federal Re-
public plays an important role in many other areas of the law, it can be
ignored here.
Disputes on individual employment rights are resolved by the la-
bour courts. German labour courts are a special branch of the court
system and are comprised of three levels: Labour courts of the first
instance; appellate labour courts; and the Federal Labour Court. La-
bour courts of the first instance and appellate labour courts are com-
posed of one or more panels. Each panel has a professional judge as
chairman and one lay judge from the employer's and employee's side.
The appellate labour courts are authorized exclusively to hear appeals
against decisions of labour courts in the first instance. Under certain
conditions, judgments handed down by appellate labour courts may be
appealed to the Federal Labour Court. The Federal Labour Court is
comprised of eight senates. Each senate has three professional judges
and one lay judge from the employer's and employee's sides.
Each worker has easy access to the labour court system. The costs
of the courts' involvement are extremely low. Parties to a dispute
may represent themselves in the labour courts and in the appellate
labour courts or, if they wish, they may be represented by legal coun-
sel. In the Federal Labour Court legal counsel is required. In the la-
bour courts and the appellate labour courts legal counsel may be
provided by an attorney or, in the alternative, a legal aid representa-
tive of the union. Most of these representatives are not full-fledged
lawyers. The parties themselves decide the type of representation
they wish to have. Since unions only provide counsel to their mem-
bers, usually free of charge (at least for the labour courts of the first
instance), this serves as an incentive for workers to join such
organizations.
One of the basic characteristics of the German labour law system is
that the implementation of individual employment rights, at least in
some especially important areas, is not merely left to the contracting
parties and the labour courts as a conflict resolving agency. Another
actor is involved which, in the Federal Republic of Germany, unlike
many other countries, is not the union; it is the works council, the
employees' statutory representative.2
Every establishment with more than five employees over eighteen
years of age, three of whom have been employed for at least six
months, is required by law to establish a works council. Contrary to
many other countries, works councils in the Federal Republic of Ger-
2. This only refers to the private sector. In the public sector the employees' statu-
tory representative is called "staff representation" and governed by a different
statute. The function of the "staff representation" in reference to the subject
matter discussed in this article is almost identical to the works council's function
in the private sector.
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many are made up exclusively of employees' representatives. Works
councils act as counterparts to the employer. They represent all work-
ers of the establishment whether they are union members or not. In
order to prevent misunderstandings, it has to be stressed that in spite
of the institutional separation between unions and works councils,
there are close links in actual practice.3
In the following sections, individual employment rights regarding
job security are used to illustrate the functioning of this interaction
between parties of the individual employment relationship, works
councils, and labour courts.
II. THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF JOB SECURITY
PROTECTION
A. The Reformulation of Dismissal Law
The legal protection of job security goes far beyond laws regarding
the employees' protection in the event of discharge. It also covers
those regulations regarding instruments which could be used as a
deviation of protection in the event of discharge. As an example, the
limitation on the legality of a contract of fixed duration is a very im-
portant aspect in this context. A contract of fixed duration expires
automatically without any need of discharge, which makes protection
against discharge useless.4 In order to reduce complexity and prevent
confusion, these implications of the regulation of job security shall be
ignored in this article. The purpose of this article is not to give a com-
prehensive picture of job security in the Federal Republic of Germany
but to describe the functioning of individual employment rights, using
those rights regarding job security as an illustration.
In order to understand the German pattern of job security protec-
tion it is important to start with a basic distinction. This distinction is
between extraordinary and ordinary dismissal. The distinction dates
back to the origins of labour law in the 19th century. The original
regulation was based on the idea that nobody should be forced to re-
main in a contractual relationship which he or she does not wish to
continue. Thus, if in a case of grave misconduct or other urgent reason
it was no longer tolerable for either of the two parties to continue the
employment relationship, the weapon of extraordinary dismissal
could be used to terminate the contract without a term of notice. This
pattern has survived up to now. According to section 626 of the Civil
Code, an extraordinary dismissal is allowable only "if there are rea-
sons which in view of all circumstances of the case and in evaluating
3. The most important link is the fact that the large majority of works council mem-
bers are either members or officials of trade unions. For details see M. WEIss,
supm note 1, at 151-53.
4. See id at 46-48.
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the interests of both parties make it intolerable for either of the par-
ties to fulfill the contract until the period of notice." Today, as in the
past, the employee is protected by the fact that an extraordinary dis-
missal is only legally allowed if such an exceptional cause can be
proved. This, in case of dispute, is subject to judicial control.
Originally, in cases in which the preconditions of an extraordinary
dismissal were not fulfilled, the ordinary dismissal could be used by
either one of the parties to unilaterally terminate the contract. The
only condition was to observe a term of notice; no further justification
was required. This explains why the history of establishing rules for
job security in Germany, to a great extent, is identical with a reformu-
lation of the preconditions of the so called ordinary dismissal.
The first step in this direction was the increase of the minimum
duration of the term of notice. Here it has to be stressed that up to
now the law made a distinction between blue-collar and white-collar
workers. Blue-collar workers were treated worse than white-collar
workers not only in reference to the term of notice, but also in defin-
ing the criteria for calculating the term of notice.5 As far as the latter
is concerned, the Federal Constitutional Court in a recent decision de-
clared the distinction to be unconstitutional.6 Meanwhile, the ques-
tion of whether the distinction between blue-collar and white-collar
workers regarding the term of notice is constitutional is pending in the
Federal Constitutional Court.7 It is difficult to predict the outcome of
this decision, which is expected in the near future. If the Court would
consider the difference to be unconstitutional, this would mean that
the main distinction in the legal treatment of blue- and white-collar
workers regarding individual employment rights would disappear.
Although the rules on the term of notice, at least in principle, focus
on the dismissal declared by either the employer or the employee, it is
different for the second and more important step in the development
of job security. The second step only refers to employee's protection
against the dismissal declared by the employer. Currently, it is still
possible for the employee to use the ordinary dismissal as a tool to
terminate the contract unilaterally without giving any reasons as long
as he observes the term of notice.
After several attempts to reformulate the original pattern,S the
present structure was finally fixed in the Act on Dismissal Protection
of 1951. Since that time the Act has been amended several times. The
5. For blue-collar workers only the time after the age of thirty-five is counted,
whereas for white-collar workers it is counted after twenty-five years of age.
6. Decision of 16 November 1982, EzA Art. 3 GG number 13.
7. See the decision of the Appellate Labour Court of Lower Saxony of 23 April 1982,
EzA Art. 3 GG number 15, in which it requests the Federal Constitutional Court
to give a ruling thereon.
8. The most important one was by the Statute on Works Councils in 1920.
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basic idea of this Act was to reverse the traditional structure of the
ordinary dismissal declared by the employer. Whereas formerly the
legality of such a dismissal was the normal case, the normal case now
is the illegality; the legality has become the exception. In addition to
the Act on Protection Against Dismissals, which focuses on the gen-
eral minimum protection, a few special laws provide further protec-
tion for specific groups of workers.9 These groups include, but are not
limited to, handicapped persons, pregnant women, members of statu-
tory representative bodies of workers, and apprentices. Protection for
specific groups, however, will not be covered in this article.
The Act on Protection Against Dismissals, in principle, applies to
all employees throughout the employment hierarchy. It must be
stressed, however, that small establishments below a minimum size
are excluded from the coverage of the Act. Establishments with five
or fewer workers (apprentices not included) are excluded. Up to 1985
this figure was decisive regardless of whether the employees involved
were part-time or full-time workers. However, since 1985 the law has
stated that the only workers who will be considered are those who
have been employed for at least ten hours per week or forty-five hours
per month. Currently the exemption excludes more than ten percent
of the total workforce in the Federal Republic of Germany.O Corre-
sponding with this large exclusion is the fact that the frequency of
dismissals in these small establishments is much higher than in estab-
lishments of larger size." This explains why the exemption of those
small establishments still causes controversial debates.
Only workers employed for at least six months by the same em-
ployer are covered by the Act. In view of the fact that a high percent-
age of dismissals take place during the first six months of
employment, this delay of protection is also subject to criticism.' 2
B. The Concept of Social Justification
According to section 1 of the Act on Protection Against Dismissal,
a dismissal is normally socially unjustified and therefore illegal. The
Act lists three exceptions which render a dismissal legal. Thus, when
the legality of a dismissal is contested the employer must prove that
the prerequisites for such an exceptional case are fulfilled. There are
9. For a survey see M. WEISS, supra note 1, at 90 - 91.
10. See H. RussIG, AUSGESTALTUNG uND EFFEKTIvrrAT GESETZLICHER REGELUNGEN
ZuM KUENDIGUNGSSCHUTZ UND ZUR STATUSSICHERUNG BEI INNERBETRIEBLICHEN
PERSONALMASSNAHMEN, in K.Dohse/U.Juergens/H.Russig (editors), Status-
sicherung im Industriebetrieb 91 - 134 (1982), at g2.
11. J. FALKE/A. HOELLAND/B. RHODE/G. ZnImMRmANN, KuENDIGUNGSPRAXIS UND
KuENDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IN DER BUNDESREPUBLICK DEUTSCHLAND 961 (1980).
Twenty percent of all dismissals declared by employers take place in those
establishments.
12. See H. RUSSIG, supra note 10, at 93.
[Vol. 67:82
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS IN GERMANY
three reasons that justify a dismissal: the personality of the employee;
the behaviour of the employee; or economic reasons.13
A cause for dismissal which is justified by reasons concerning the
personality of the worker refers to a situation in which the worker is
unable to fulfill the requirements of his job. The main example fitting
this category is illness. But it should be pointed out that the economic
interest of the employer in dismissing the sick worker must be care-
fully balanced against the interests of the worker who is ill. Thus, it is
necessary to examine the details of the economic impact, the impact
on the other workers, the possibility of transfer, and the duration of
employment. One of the decisive factors to be evaluated is the size of
the enterprise. Large enterprises are thought to cope better than
small enterprises with the problems created by workers who are
sick.' 4 In short, the dismissal is legal only if, as a last resort and after
such an evaluation, it turns out to be necessary.
A cause for dismissal based on reasons concerning the behaviour of
the worker refers to misconduct in its broadest sense. The dismissal
differs from an extraordinary dismissal in terms of the gravity and
intensity of the misconduct. Only very grave misconduct may lead to
extraordinary dismissal. Since all the circumstances of a specific situ-
ation must be taken into account, it would be useless to list every type
of misconduct justifying such a dismissal. The legality of the dismissal
depends on the details of the particular situation.15
A cause for dismissal based on economic reasons may be due to
external influences (economic crisis, etc.) as well as measures taken
by an employer (introduction of new technologies, measures of ration-
alization, etc.). The dismissal is justified if, due to the economic situa-
tion, it has become impossible for the employer to retain the worker
any longer. The employer must prove the details of the economic situ-
ation and, thereby, imply necessity for the dismissal if the dismissal is
contested in court. It must be stressed that the employer may take
organizational measures (introduction of new technologies, measures
of rationalization, etc.) which may lead to dismissals which are not
subject to judicial control. They are considered to be part of manage-
ment's prerogative. 16 However, as will be shown below,17 the works
council is involved to a certain extent.
13. For a survey see Weiss, Protection Against Unfair Dismissals in Western Ger-
many, in PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EmpLOYEES AGAINsT UNJUST DIsCHARGE
153-58 (J.Stieber & J.Blackburn eds. 1983).
14. See Federal Labour Court decision of 19 August 1976, EzA § 1 KSchG - Krankheit
-number 3.
15. For an illustration of the most frequent reasons belonging to this category see H.
RUSSIG, supra note 10, at 98.
16. See the basic decision of the Federal Labour Court of 26 June 1975, EzA § 1
KschG - Betriebsbedingte Kuendigung - number 1.
17. See infra pp. 91-93.
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If the employer sells the plant or part of the plant this does not
constitute a justification for dismissal. According to section 613 (a) of
the Civil Code the employment relationship in such situations is trans-
ferred automatically to the successor, and according to paragraph 4 of
the same section any dismissal due to the selling of the plant or part of
the plant is strictly forbidden. The Federal Labour Court has suc-
ceeded in defending this rigid rule against attempts to create an excep-
tion.S It is evident that this rule may lead to difficulties in selling
plants, and as a result, in practical effect, preserving the rule may not
save jobs at all. This explains why its rigidity is highly controversial.
In a case of a dismissal based on economic reasons the main prob-
lem normally involves the selection of the employees to be dismissed.
In many countries this selection is made according to the seniority
rule,19 or according to another principle which can be easily handled.
However, it is much more complicated in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. According to the law, the selection must take into account so
called "social aspects." The underlying concept of "social aspects" is
that those who suffer the most from the effects of the dismissal should
be the last ones to be dismissed.2o The problem with "social aspects" is
that it refers to all possible factors defining the social situation of a
worker (age, duration of employment, marital status, number of chil-
dren, economic status, etc.). In other words, "social aspects" refers to
a very complex phenomenon not easily defined. Instead of focusing on
certainty, practicability, and simplicity it focuses on social justice for
each individual case.
If, due to economic, technical, or other justifiable reasons it is nec-
essary to keep specific employees who in view of "social aspects"
would have to be dismissed, the criterion of "social aspects" does not
apply. It must, however, be pointed out that conditions for such an
exemption, by court interpretation, have become very difficult to
satisfy.2 1
Even when a cause for dismissal is based on the personality of a
worker or an economic reason, the dismissal is still considered socially
18. See, for example, the Federal Labour Court's decisions of 22 May 1985, EzA § 613
a BGB number 46, and of 25 June 1985, EzA § 613 a BGB number 48.
19. See U. JUERGENs/K. DOnSE, STATUSSICHERUNG DURCH SENIORrAET. SENI-
ORITAETSREGELN ALS DREH- UND ANGELPUNKT BETRIEBSNAHER GEWERKscHAFr-
SPOLITIK IN DEN USA, in K. DOHSE/U. JUERGENS/H. RUssIG (editors), supra note
10, at 289-318; I. HELLBERG, SENIORrIruETSREGELN PER GESETz - DER FALL
SCHWEDEN, in K. DOHSE/U. JUERGENS/H. RUSSIG (editors), supra note 10, at 319-
348.
20. See Federal Labour Court decision of 24 March 1983, EzA § 1 KschG - Betrieb-
sbedingte Kundigung - number 21, p.180.
21. See F. BECKER/G. ETZEL/H.W. FRIEDRICH/K. GRoENINGER/ W. HJLLEBRECHT/F.
ROsT/H. WEIGAND/M. WOLFF/I. WOLFF, GEMEINSCHAFrSKOMMENTAR ZUM
KUENDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ UND SONSTIGE KUENDIGUNGSSCHU'rZRECHTLICHE
VORSCHRIFTEN 598-601, (2d ed. 1984).
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unjustified and, therefore, illegal if the worker can be transferred to a
comparable job with comparable conditions either immediately or af-
ter retraining. In the latter case the expenses for retraining must re-
main at a reasonable level taking into consideration the financial
resources of the employer. The dismissal is even socially unjustified
when the worker has agreed to be transferred to a job with lower
working conditions.
In any event, the possibility of a transfer within the same establish-
ment should be examined. If, under certain conditions which will be
explained in the next paragraph, the works council objects to the dis-
missal, the possibility of transfer to any establishment of the enter-
prise is subject to examination.
C. The Role of the Works Council in Protecting Job Security
1. The Works Council's Involvement in Dismissals
According to section 102 paragraph 1 of the Work Constitution Act
the employer is obliged to consult the works council before every dis-
missal, whether it is an ordinary or an extraordinary dismissal. If the
employer does not fulfill this duty the dismissal is null and void. The
employer has to inform the works council of the persons to be dis-
missed, the type of dismissal (ordinary or extraordinary), the cause of
the dismissal, the effective date of the dismissal, the criteria applied
for selection, and the examination of possibilities of transfer. In short,
the works council is entitled to receive all the information which is
needed to determine the legality of the dismissal. It has to be stressed
that the works council always has to be consulted before the declara-
tion of the dismissal. A violation of this rule cannot be corrected
later.
In the case of extraordinary dismissals, the works council has a pe-
riod of three days to agree to the dismissal or to declare reservations in
writing. If the works council does not react during this period, agree-
ment is presumed by law. Reservations declared by the works council
do not prevent the employer from dismissing the employee. Such res-
ervations have no legal effect, except to strengthen, in court, the case
of the dismissed worker compared to the case in which the works
council agrees or does nothing.
In the case of an ordinary dismissal, the works council has a period
of one week to react. It can agree, do nothing, declare reservations in
writing, or declare an objection to the dismissal (also in writing). If
the works council does not react, agreement is presumed by law.
None of the reactions prevents the employer from declaring the dis-
missal. The only reaction which may have some effect is the declara-
tion of an objection.
Before discussing the effects of a declaration of objection, its pre-
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requisites have to be sketched briefly. The prerequisites are enumer-
ated in section 102 paragraph 3 of the Work Constitution Act:
a) The employer has not, or at least not sufficiently, taken
account of "social aspects" in selecting the persons to be
dismissed;
b) The dismissal would violate a guideline on selection;
c) The employee to be dismissed could be transferred to a
comparable job within the same establishment or in another
establishment of the enterprise at once or after retraining or
further training; or
d) The employee has agreed to be transferred to a job with
lower working conditions available within the establishment
or in another establishment of the enterprise.
The works council is supposed to have a much better opportunity
than the individual employee to examine the application of "social as-
pects" or the possibility of a transfer. It must be stressed that the
works council can improve control on the selection procedure by so
called guidelines on selection. But it must also be pointed out that in
the case of a dismissal, the scope of such guidelines is limited. It is not
possible to reduce the criterion of "social aspects" to one or two factors
(as for example age or duration of employment) and thereby pervert
the aim and complexity of the notion.22 Such guidelines are mainly an
instrument to enumerate the different factors and to put them in a
certain order of priority. Only a minority of enterprises have guide-
lines referring to selection in dismissal cases.23 One of the main rea-
sons for the hesitation of works councils to initiate such guidelines
may be that they are afraid of being pushed into a role of responsibil-
ity for conditions of dismissal.
If the works council made a written objection in due time there are
two legal consequences to be considered. First, the employer must
hand over the written declaration of the objection to the dismissed
employee simultaneously with the declaration of dismissal. This actu-
ally means that the employee is getting a strategical concept of how to
fight the dismissal in court.
Second, the dismissed worker must be kept in employment until
the end of the lawsuit if the dismissed worker sues the employer in
court and demands to remain employed until the end of the lawsuit.
It must be stressed that, at the same time, section 102 of the Work
Constitution Act provides a tool for the employer to free himself from
this obligation by obtaining a court injunction. Among other causes,
the claim to get an injunction is justified if the continuation of employ-
ment would be "an intolerable economical burden" for the employer.
22. See Federal Labour Court decision of 20 October 1983, EzA § 1 KSchG - Betrieb-
sbedingte Kuendigung -, number 28.
23. See H. RussIG, supra note 10, at 104.
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Facing the fact that a lawsuit on dismissals can last several years, it
becomes evident that it is not exceptional to meet this burden.
2. The Works Council's Role in Shaping the Preconditions and
Consequences of Dismissals
The works council's influence on job security can only be evaluated
after understanding two further aspects. First, the works council has
some input in employers' decisions which may lead to dismissals based
on economic reasons. Second, the works council has an instrument to
reach some employees suffering compensation disadvantages due to
such measures taken by the employer. However, it should be under-
stood that the works council enjoys these participation rights only in
establishments with a minimum of twenty workers.
The works council's participation rights involve to the following
decisions: reduction of operations; partial or total closure; relocation
of the plant or essential parts of the plant; merger with other plants;
basic changes in the organization, the purpose, or the equipment of the
plant; and introduction of entirely new work methods and production
processes. In those events, the employer has to provide the works
council with "full information in time." Information "in time" means
that it is given early in the planning stage. "Full information" means
that management not only has to disclose its plans but also has to pro-
vide information on all possible alternatives and modifications which
were or are to be taken into account in the particular situation. The
idea is to provide the works council a significant opportunity to partici-
pate by supplying them with all the information in the employer's
possession.
In addition to supplying information, the employer is required to
reach a so called "compromise of interests" with the works council.
This means that the employer should try to come to an agreement
with the works council on whether and how the specific measures en-
visaged by management should be carried out. If an agreement is not
reached, either side can call in the president of the State Labour Of-
fice to act as a mediator. If this mediation is not successful, or if
neither the employer nor the works council wants the State Labour
Office president's mediation, either side may take the issue to the arbi-
tration committee. The arbitration committee consists of an equal
number of members appointed by the works council and the em-
ployer. The committee also has a neutral president who chairs the
committee. In reference to the "compromise of interests," the arbitra-
tion committee has no power to impose a binding decision on the par-
ties, it can only make a proposal. It is up to the employer and the
works council to accept or to reject the proposal. In other words, the
law provides a procedure to reach a "compromise of interests," but if
the procedure fails to be successful, the decision is left to the em-
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ployer. The works council has no legal power to force the employer in
a certain direction.
Regardless of whether the employer has fulfilled the duty to in-
form the works council and tried to reach a "compromise of interests,"
the works council is always entitled to enforce a so called "social
plan." A "social plan" is simply a legally binding agreement regarding
the compensation given to workers who are affected by management's
decision. The social plan is by no means confined to financial compen-
sation. It may also include programs of retraining, priority in hiring
for new jobs, and so on. If agreement on a "social plan" cannot be
reached, both sides are entitled to appeal to the arbitration committee,
which in this case acts as a decision maker. Its decision is binding on
both sides.
There is no minimum or maximum limit for a "social plan." It is
up to the parties to reach a mutually agreeable plan. If a "social plan"
is imposed by the arbitration committee, the committee's discretionary
power is limited to a certain extent. According to the formula which
was valid until 1985, the arbitration committee had to make its deci-
sion on the "social plan" considering the social needs of the affected
workers as well as the financial strength of the enterprise. As this
very broad formula covered almost any possible decision, judicial con-
trol turned out to be totally ineffective. This is why the formula was
amended in 1985.24 According to this amendment, the determination
of compensation for economic decline (especially lower wages, loss of
fringe benefits, loss of the right to a pension, moving expenses to a
new location, or increased traveling expenses) will take into account
the circumstances of each individual case. The opportunities of the
affected workers in the labour market must also be taken into consid-
eration. Workers who may be retrained to perform an adequate job
within the same plant, in another plant of the enterprise, or in another
enterprise belonging to the same group of enterprises, but who never-
theless do not accept the offer of such a job, will not receive compensa-
tion. As far as the extent of the "social plan" is concerned, the
committee must find a solution which does not endanger the future
existence of the enterprise or the remaining jobs.
In an effort to provide stability to new businesses, the 1985 amend-
ment established a privilege for enterprises which are in their initial
stage. If the employer does not voluntarily offer a "social plan," such a
plan cannot be enforced by the works council in the first four years
after the formation of an enterprise.
In order to fully understand the works council's role, it is necessary
to note that it is always within the works council's discretion to decide
whether and how it makes use of its rights of participation. This is
24. Act on Improvement of Job Opportunities of 1 May 1985.
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true regardless of whether these rights belong to the categories de-
scribed in sections A or B above.
D. The Labour Court's Role
As indicated above, the individual worker has a right to initiate a
lawsuit to contest the legality of the dismissal. If the court decides
that the dismissal was illegal, the continuation of the employment re-
lationship is required. Whether or not the worker was actually per-
forming work during the lawsuit, the employer must pay the
remuneration for the length of this period.
Reinstatement is the normal remedy for an illegal dismissal. But it
should be stressed that the law provides an alternative. Even in the
case of an illegal dismissal, the employer may claim dissolution of the
contract if it would be unreasonable to require him to continue cooper-
ation with the worker. It is important to know that the facts proving
this unreasonableness may be created during the lawsuit. If the court
grants the dissolution request, the employer must pay indemnities to
the worker. The law fixes only the maximum amount of those indem-
nities, which is normally 12 months wages. For workers older than 50
years of age who have been employed for at least 15 years, the maxi-
mum amount is 15 months wages. For workers older than 55 years of
age who having been employed for at least 20 years, the maximum
amount is 18 months wages. It is up to the discretion of the court to
determine the exact amount according to the circumstances of the
case.
While the law on protection against dismissal also applies to execu-
tive employees, there is a very important exemption in this respect.
The contracts of executive employees entitled to hire and fire can be
dissolved more simply, the only condition is the payment of
indemnities.
Reinstatement after a time consuming lawsuit through several
levels of the court system becomes difficult if, in the meantime, the
worker is prevented from remaining integrated in the workforce of
the establishment. This is why the right to continue working during
the lawsuit has become a big issue in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. As shown above,25 the dismissed employee may claim continu-
ation of employment during the lawsuit if the works council has
objected to the dismissal. The question has been raised as to whether,
aside from this very specific case requiring specific conditions, there is
a general duty on the employer to employ the dismissed worker until
the end of the lawsuit whether an extraordinary or ordinary dismissal
is at stake and irrespective of the works council's reaction. The Fed-
eral Labour Court, in a 1985 decision, developed the following
25. See supra pp. 90-91.
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
scheme.26 In spite of the uncertainty of the further existence of the
employment relationship, the dismissed employee has no right to con-
tinue to work except in the very exceptional case that the dismissal is
evidently illegal. If according to the decision of the court of first in-
stance the dismissal is illegal, the dismissed worker has the right to
continue working for the remaining period of the lawsuit in the appel-
late courts-until the final decision. In other words, once there is a
strong indication of the illegality of the dismissal, the employee's in-
terest to continue working dominates over the employer's interest.
The Federal Labour Court's decision has not only provoked a very
stormy debate but there also have been several attempts to circum-
vent the court's decision, which again invoked the reaction of the Fed-
eral Labour Court.27
III. PRACTICAL IMPACT ON JOB SECURITY
A. Works Council's Role
Even though the law requires each establishment with at least five
employees to establish a works council, this goal is not accomplished
in reality. In many small establishments (up to the size of fifty em-
ployees) there is no works council. On the whole, less than twenty
percent of the establishments which are supposed to have works coun-
cils actually have such bodies.28 This figure, however, may be mislead-
ing. Establishments which have a works council comprise more than
60 percent of the workforce.29 In other words, the big majority of em-
ployees are represented by works councils.
The size of the establishment seems to be one of the most decisive
factors for the frequency of dismissals declared by the employer. Less
than half of the dismissals take place in establishments which have
works councils.3 0 Whereas in small establishments which have up to
twenty employees one employee out of seven is discharged, the danger
of discharge in establishments which have above 2,000 employees is
only one employee out of forty-eight.31 Whether this distribution is
partially due to the existence and actions of works councils is difficult
26. Federal Labour Court decision of 27 February 1985, EzA § 611 - Beschaftigungsp-
flicht -, number 9.
27. See, e.g., Federal Labour Court decision of 19 December 1985, EzA § 1 KschG -
Beschaeftigungspflicht -, number 17.
28. See A. HOELAND, DAs VERHALTEN VON BETRIEBSRA=rEN IN DER KUENDIGUNG-
SSITUATION, in R.Ellermann-Witt/H.Rottleuttner/HRussig (editors),
Kuendigungspraxis, Kuendigungsschutz und Probleme der Arbeitsgericht-
sbarkeit (1983), at 67-84.
29. J. FALKE/A. HOELAND/B. RHODE/G. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 11, at 963.
30. A. HOELAND, supra note 28, at 67.
31. Id. at 68.
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to determine. Other factors such as the management's organization or
the company's image may be relevant.
As far as the works council's role in the consultation procedure is
concerned, the degree of agreement with the employer's intended dis-
missal is striking. Empirical research demonstrates that in about two-
Works council's reaction towards employer's intention to
declare an ordinary dismissal:
Reaction Number of employees per establisbment
5-100 101-300 301-1000 above 1000 average
Expressive
Agreement 52 43 33 32 43%
No reaction 17 23 24 18 21%
Reservation 18 12 15 21 16%
Objection 13 22 28 29 20%
thirds of the cases there is agreement with the employer's intention.32
But here again, the size of the establishment implies significant differ-
ences as the above figures show.3 3
The different works council's reactions in establishments of differ-
ent size may be primarily explained by the fact that works councils in
bigger establishments are much more qualified than those in smaller
establishments. This gap of qualification is especially relevant in view
of the expertise necessary to formulate a proper objection. The formal
requirements for a declaration of objection have become so compli-
cated that works councils in small establishments quite often are un-
able to meet those standards.3 4
The frequency of agreement with the dismissal also depends on the
type of and the reason for dismissal. Thus, agreement with extraordi-
nary dismissals is more frequent than agreement with ordinary dis-
missals.35 Among the ordinary dismissals, those caused by economic
reasons are provoking the most resistance of works councils. If the
reasons are based on the personality of the employee (illness, decrease
of working capacity), agreement tends also to be rather low. The fre-
quency of agreement reaches its highest percentage when individual
misconduct of the employee is involved.36
According to the available research data, the employer in the ma-
jority of the cases is not impressed by a negative reaction of the works
council toward his intention to dismiss an employee. If the works
32. See J. FALKE/A. HOELAND/B. RHODE/G. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 11, at 963.
33. A. HOELAND, supra note 28, at 70.
34. See H. RUSSIG, supra note 10, at 122.
35. A. HOELAND, supra note 28, at 69.
36. Id at 73.
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council merely declares reservations, this does not change the em-
ployer's mind in 90 percent of the cases. In such a situation the dismis-
sal is declared anyway.37 However, the situation is significantly
different in cases where the works council declares an objection. In
this situation only slightly more than sixty percent of the cases are
dismissed in spite of the objection. 38
Evidently there is a close relationship between the works council's
reaction and lawsuits initiated by the dismissed employee. If the
works council has objected, the likelihood that the employee will initi-
ate a lawsuit is much greater than if the works council agreed ex-
pressly or did not react at all.39
In spite of the law's intention, when a works council objects, only a
marginal number of the dismissed workers are kept in employment
during the lawsuit. Research conducted in 1978 revealed the following
statistics. Works councils objected to 18,547 dismissals which were
still declared by the employer. In 3,033 of those cases the dismissed
employees initiated a lawsuit. In only 902 of those cases did employees
claim employment during the lawsuit according to section 102 para-
graph 5 of the Work Constitution Act, and in 522 cases the claim was
granted.40 Even though this figure, when compared with the total
number of objections, seems to be negligible (2.8 percent), it should be
noted that more than half of those who actually sought to remain inte-
grated in the establishment during the lawsuit were successful (58
percent). There is no data available on how the Federal Labour
Court's extension of the employee's right to remain employed during
the lawsuit would change the situation.
Even though the works council is supposed to control the obser-
vance of selection according to the concept of "social aspects," in cases
of dismissals based on economic reasons the council cannot prevent
overrepresentation by groups who have specific difficulties in the la-
bour market.41 This may be because the concept of "social aspects" is
so intangible that it cannot be controlled. It may also be because the
works councils, as well as the employers, tend to discharge the weaker
groups within the workforce in order to improve the market chances
for the establishment in the future. Conclusions of this kind, how-
ever, are mere speculations.
On the whole, it should be stressed that the empirical data con-
cerning the works council's influence on the dismissal practice may be
misleading. It may be that the main function of the works council's
37. Id- at 76.
38. 1&
39. I at 77.
40. J. FALKE/A. HOELAND/B. RHODE/G. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 11, at 853.
41. See J. FALKE, Kundigungspraxis und Kundigungsschutz, in R. Ellermann-Witt/
H. Rottleuthner/H. Russig, supra note 26, at 13.
[Vol. 67:82
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS IN GERMANY
participation right is a preventive one.42 The mere possibility of the
works council's involvement in many cases may lead the employer to
exclude dismissal as an instrument of personnel policy; without facing
such difficulties, dismissal would be used. Even if much of this area
remains dark, there can be no doubt that the works council's role in
the area of job security is not irrelevant. The main problem is
whether the works council's participation protects only those privi-
leged groups among the workforce who would not be endangered by
the employer's policy. In other words, it may well be that the com-
bined activity of employer and the works council is on strengthening
measures which focus on minority groups. This raises the question of
whether it is a good idea to deprive the individual worker of the oppor-
tunity to put pressure on the works council. The normal instrument
of pressure, the threat of refusal of reelection, does not play any role
in this context. Those who are dismissed will not participate in the
next election.
In discussing the role of the works council it should be mentioned
that works councils have proved to be very successful in achieving "so-
cial plans." Again, the negotiation of a "social plan" may have a pre-
ventive effect which does not show up in empirical data. It may well
be that an employer determined to rationalize is giving up this idea in
view of the works council's claims referring to the "social plan." This
may save jobs in the short run, but in the long run it could result in a
greater loss of jobs. In other words, whether and how far the "social
plan" is an instrument to increase job security may be uncertain. This
again is subject to manyfold speculation.43
There is, however, no doubt that the "social plan" is an excellent
tool to provide compensation for those whose dismissal could not be
prevented. But here the problem of equal justice arises. It is simply
fortuitous whether a dismissal is combined with a situation which im-
plies a "social plan." And it is also fortuitous whether the amount of
compensation based on the "social plan" is satisfactory or not. This
depends exclusively on the economic strength of the respective com-
pany. In short, from the perspective of the dismissed worker who nor-
mally does not get any severance pay, it may be very doubtful that this
should be significantly different simply due to the fact that the dismis-
sal takes place in the context of a measure implying a "social plan" in
a prosperous company.
42. See in this context M. WEiss, INsTITUTIONAL FoRMs OF WoRKERS' PARTICIPATION
wrrH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, in IIRA, 7th
World Congress Proceedings (1986), Volume 2, at 1-16 (p.11).
43. For a survey on the present discussion see V. BEUTHIE , DER SOZIALAUFrRAG DES
SOZLPLANS, in ZfA (1982), at 181-206.
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B. The Role of the Labour Court System
First, it has to be stressed that the initiation of lawsuits by dis-
missed employees not only correlates with the works council's beha-
viour but also with other factors. Whereas, on the one hand it is true
that the frequency of dismissals is declining in bigger establishments
compared to smaller ones, it is the other way around as far as the fre-
quency of lawsuits initiated in reference to those dismissals is con-
cerned.44 In addition, empirical data shows that when one compares
white-collar to blue-collar, men to women, and foreign workers to do-
mestic workers, the white-collar, men, and foreign workers are over-
represented among those who fight dismissals by initiating lawsuits.45
In the large majority of cases, a compromise is reached in court
which leads to both the dissolution of the labour contract and to the
payment of an indemnity. In such a case, the indemnity tends to be
above the level which would be reached if the court would dissolve the
contract according to the procedure described above.46 According to
an empirical study conducted in 1978, only about nine percent of those
who initiate a lawsuit succeed in getting reinstated.47 In other words,
contrary to the legal pattern in which reinstatement would be the rule
and dissolution of the contract combined with the payment of indem-
nity would be the exception, in actual practice it is exactly the other
way around.
It is interesting to note that this pattern did not change in spite of
the tremendous growth of unemployment. Even if the crisis caused
the number of dismissals and, correspondingly, the number of lawsuits
on those dismissals to increase, the distribution between reinstate-
ment and dissolution of the contract combined with financial compen-
sation remained more or less the same.48 In spite of this result it
seems to be too superficial to draw the conclusion that the described
system of protection against dismissals has nothing to do with job se-
curity. First, an inquiry of those who initiate lawsuits shows a very
interesting result. The main motivation of those plaintiffs who were
dismissed in smaller establishments is not to get reinstated by the law-
suit. It is to either intimidate the employer or to get financial
compensation.49
This attitude may result because dismissals in small establishments
44. J. FA=cu, supra note 41, at 27.
45. Id. at 26.
46. See supra p. 93-94.
47. J. FAuKE/A. HOELAND/B. RHoDE/G. ZimmRmANN, supra note 11, at 861; see also
J. DIEKMANN, Empirie betrieblicher Kuendigungen und Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit,
in R. Ellermann-Witt/H. Rottleuthner/H. Russig, supra note 28, at 97-111.
48. This statement cannot be verified by empirical research; it is based on the au-
thor's information acquired in many conversations with labour judges.
49. J. FALKE, supra note 41, at 30.
[Vol. 67:82
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS IN GERMANY
Number of employees
Decisive up to 20 2-250 251-1000 above 1000 average
motivation for
initiating
law suit
Reinstatement 20.0 35.1 45.5 48.3 31.5%
Intimidation
of employer 60.0 50.2 41.8 20.7 51.1%
Financial
Compensation 11.4- 10.2 9.1 20.7 11.2%
Urged by legal
counsel 8.6 4.4 3.6 10,3 6.3%
are quite often combined with personal deception and a cut off of close
personal ties. Thus, reinstatement is not a realistic outcome.
Even if this motivational aspect is ignored, the mere fact that the
employer has to face the works council as well as the labour court
should not be overlooked. It puts pressure on him to at least carefully
examine whether, in case of a dispute, a satisfactory justification of the
dismissal can be presented. This, at least in principle, leads to an ex-
clusion of mere arbitrariness in dismissal policy. It remains an open
question whether protection against dismissals in a market economy
can achieve more without endangering the functioning of the system.
IV. CONCLUSION
In spite of its weaknesses and deficiencies the described system of
job security regulation is, at least in principle, well accepted by all the
relevant actors: trade unions; employers associations; and political
parties. Even though the last few years have seen many attempts to-
ward deregulation of labour law standards in order to achieve more
flexibility, protection against dismissals has never seriously been in-
cluded within the subject of this discussion.
In the 1970's some efforts were made to change the system in order
to improve the employees' protection. A commission composed of del-
egates representing trade unions, employers associations, governmen-
tal agencies, and professors was established to draft a Code on
individual employment rights. The result of the commission's work
was published in 1977. In regard to protection against dismissals, this.
draft contained only negligible corrections.5 0 The most important step
which could have been made would have been the full equalization of
the term of notice for blue-collar and white-collar workers. The Ger-
man Confederation of Trade Unions, however, published an alterna-
50. See IG METALT, Kuendigungsschutztagungen 1977 und 1978 (1978), at 346-375.
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tive proposal for such a Code at the same time.5 ' According to this
proposal the change would have been more dramatic. First, the works
council would have been entitled to object, without preconditions, to
any dismissal. This objection would prevent the employer's opportu-
nity to dismiss. If the employer still wanted to discharge the em-
ployee, he would have to initiate a lawsuit. In this situation, only the
court could terminate the contract. While it was evident that this pro-
posal was meant to elevate the employee's protection against dismis-
sals, it became clear that such a solution would increase the gap
between employees in establishments without works councils. The
proposal, however, was primarily contested on the grounds that flexi-
ble reactions in market needs would be endangered.
The commission's draft, as well as the Trade Union Confedera-
tion's draft, remain mere proposals. In view of the economic crisis and
its effects on the labour market, nobody dared to change the well es-
tablished pattern of job security regulation. This attitude is still pre-
vailing. All signs presently are supporting the assumption that the
status quo will not be changed in the near future.
51. Id- at 338-345.
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